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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in reversing the

judgment of the trial court which ruled the six acres which the
respondents purchased at the 1969 tax sale was not located in
Davis County.
2.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in reversing the

judgment of the trial court which held that a dispute existed in
1893 as to where the county boundary was between Davis and Weber
County in the area of the disputed six acres.
3.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in reversing the

judgment of the trial court which held that Section 86.2 of the
compiled Laws of Utah (1893) (Utah Code Ann. S 17-1-33 (1953))
allowed Davis and Weber Counties to resolve a dispute or
uncertainty regarding a boundary between two counties.
4.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in reversing the

judgment of the trial court which held that the location of the
main channel of the Weber River, which was the boundary between
Davis and Weber Counties, could not be located in 1893.
5.

Did the Court of Appeals acting sua sponte, abuse

its discretion in ruling that the issue of whether Davis County
conducted the 1969 tax sale properly could not be tried.
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the decision
rendered by Judge Ronald Hyde after a full presentation of the
evidence by both sides.

The full opinion of the Utah Court of

Appeals is found at page A-l of the appendix.

A copy of the

order denying rehearing is contained on page A-2 of the appendix.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals entered a decision in this
matter on November 9, 1989.

The Utah Court of Appeals entered

its Order denying rehearing on December 20, 1989.

Section 78-2-

2(3) of the Utah Code (1989) confers jurisdiction on the Utah
Supreme Court to review Court of Appeals' decisions by a Writ of
Certiorari.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS
Pertinent provisions in this case come from the
compiled Laws of Utah 1888 Section 86.2, Section 17-1-3 Utah Code
Ann. (1953), Section 17-1-9, 17-1-32 and 17-1-33 Utah Code Ann.,
1953), the full texts are included either in the body of the
petition or in Appendix A-3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was bench tried before Judge Ronald Hyde
sitting in the district court of Weber County on August 26, 1986.
The Weber District Court ruled after a full evidentiary trial
that the tax sale conducted by Davis County in 1969 under which
the respondents acquired title to the six acres in question was
invalid.

The trial court concluded the tax sale was invalid

because the six acres in question was not located in Davis
County.
The trial court specifically found that an exact
location of the main channel of the Weber River (which was the
boundary between Davis and Weber Counties) could not be
determined prior to 1893.

All of the evidence presented by both

parties proved the Weber River prior to 1893 was subject to

change.

That in 1893 a definite uncertainty existed as to the

location of the main channel of the Weber River and the boundary
between Davis and Weber Counties.

That Weber and Davis Counties

acted pursuant to the provisions of Section 86*2 of the compiled
laws of 1888 (same as Section 17-1-33, Utah Code Ann. (1953)).
That Davis and Weber Counties jointly determined that
an uncertainty existed in 1893 as to the main channel of the
Weber River (which was the boundary between Davis and Weber
Counties, see Sections 17-1-3, 17-1-9 and 17-1-32 which are set
forth in appendix A-3. The two counties jointly resolved that a
survey of the main channel of the Weber River should be made.
Based upon the 1893 survey, Davis and Weber Counties accepted in
1894 the prior survey.

The 1894 survey put the main channel of

the Weber in its present location which was substantially south
of the six acres in question.

The trial court concluded the six

acres in question was located in Weber County so the tax sale
conducted by Davis County in 1969 was invalid and of no effect
whatsoever.

The trial court concluded that since the petitioner

UDOT had previously acquired the six acres in question by deed in
1964 from the recorded owners, that the petitioner UDOT is the
recorded owner of the six acres.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court on November 9, 1989.

The Utah Court of Appeals denied the

petitioner UDOT, Weber and Davis Counties petition for re-hearing
on December 20, 1989.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
In May of 1964 the petitioner UDOT purchased 24.41
acres from the recorded owner Robert Dansie (now deceased).

The

24 acres were located near Uintah Junction where the Weber River
intersects with U.S. Highway 89.

The deed in question listed a

portion of the property south of the existing Weber River as
lying in Davis County and designated the property lying north of
the Weber River as lying in Weber County.
on June 17, 1964 in Davis County.

The deed was recorded

Through a mistake Davis County

continued to assess 18 of the 24 acres.

Davis County because the

taxes on the 18 acres were not paid for 3 years, sold the
property at its 1969 tax sale.

The parties who purchased it at

the 1969 tax sale were Messrs. Baxter (current respondent),
Thomas Holberg and Ronald Toone.

After the tax sale each of the

three above-named individuals were each deeded six of the
eighteen acres sold.

Holberg was joined in the present action

and allowed default judgment to be entered against him.

Toone's

interest was terminated in the case of Toone v. LeGrande Johnson
Construction Co.,

Civil N. 10915, Davis County.

The present respondent Baxter then commenced a quiet
title action in May 1979 against the petitioner UDOT Weber and
Davis Counties. A bench trial was held before Judge Ronald Hyde
who found that the tax sale under which the respondent Baxter
acquired the title was invalid.
is found in appendix A-4.

The decision of the trial court

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT APPEARS THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A
DECISION TO REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT AND QUIET
TITLE IN THE RESPONDENT'S BAXTER AND THEN
PROCEEDED TO IGNORE WHATEVER FACTS IN THE
RECORD THAT WERE TO THE CONTRARY.
The petitioner UDOT, Weber and Davis Counties on page
two of their brief indicated in the last paragraph that "...[t]he
Lower Court bifurcated the trial of the issues in this case.

It

was determined to first try the issue of whether the property was
located in Weber County.

If the respondents Baxters lost on this

issuef which they did, there was no reason to then try the issue
of whether the petitioner Davis County conducted the tax sale
property."

A reading of the respondent Baxters's brief does not

indicate any objection with this statement.

This Court sua

sponte in its footnote 2 on page 4 found because this Court could
not find a ruling on the bifurcation issue in any order which it
could find, ruled an abandonment of this defense on the part of
the petitioners.
The Utah Court of Appeals referred on many occasions in
its decision to the trial of the earlier case of Toone v,
LeGrande Johnson Construction Co.f Civil No. 29015 (Davis
District Court).

The Toone and Baxter cases involved the exact

same issues, but only between different parties.

The respondent

Baxters specifically referred to the trial of the Toone case and
indicated the issues were bifurcated and attached a copy of the
pretrial Order.

From the foregoing it was always assumed by the

parties that the present action would also be bifurcated.

It

would be a total exercise in futility to try the issue of whether
the tax sale was conducted properly by the petitioner Davis
County if the subject property was found to not be located in
Davis County.

Finally, on page 16 of the proceedings before

Judge Roth on August 4, 1986, the attorney for petitioner UDOT
make specific reference to the bifurcation of the issues in this
case by talking about what issues are to be tried in the first
trial.
Finally, the Respondent Baxter never disputed the
statement contained in the petitioner's brief that in fact the
issues in this case have been bifurcated.

It can only constitute

a sheer abuse of discretion and a definite prejudice against the
petitioners for the Utah Court of Appeals to conclude that the
petitioner Utah Department of Transportation abandoned its
defense of whether the tax sale by the petitioner Davis County
was conducted properly.
The petitioners cite the case of UDOT v. Glen E.
Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 (1979).

In this case the defendant who was

acting pro se attempted to introduce evidence before the Supreme
Court which had not been argued in the Lower Court.

The Supreme

Court would not allow the Defendants to argue for the first time
evidence which was being heard for the first time on the appeal.
By this reasoning it would be totally improper for the Appellate
Court to now consider and rule on evidence which was not raised
or controverted by the respondents Baxters.

POINT II
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS WRONGLY CONCLUDED
THAT A QUIET TITLE ACTION IN 1946 FOUND THE
SIX ACRES IN QUESTION TO BELONG IN DAVIS
COUNTY.
It appears that whenever an Appellate Court becomes so
result oriented, it proceeds to bootstrap its decision with
erroneous and wrong conclusions which are not supported by the
record.
On page 2 of the Appellate Court's decision, it reads
as follows:
In March, 1946, title to the 18 acres tract
near the border separating Davis and Weber
Counties was quieted in Tasma Dansie in a
decree that contained a legal description of
the tract and characterized it as lying in
Davis County.
The petitioner UDOT prepared an Exhibit "C" which is
located between pages 432 and 433 of the record which depicts and
shows the 1946 quiet title action.

The decree described the

property which it found to be Weber County.
identified in yellow.

The decree also described certain property

as being located in Davis County.
in red on the Exhibit.
blue.

This property is

This property was identified

The subject six acres is depicted in

The 1946 decree shows the subject six acres as being

located in both counties and the respondents Baxters never
questioned the foregoing in their brief.

(Appendix A-5.)

For

the Court of Appeals to conclude facts to the contrary
constitutes a clear usurpation and abuse of its discretion.

POINT III
THE APPELLATE COURT IN ITS RESULT ORIENTED
DECISION FOUND IT NECESSARY TO GO OUTSIDE THE
RECORD TO BOOTSTRAP ITSELF IN FINDING A BASIS
TO REVERSE THE LOWER COURT.
The Court of Appeals on page 7 of its decision relied
on some laws and ordinances of the State of Deseret 1850-51 which
it had found on file at the L.D.S. Church Historian's Office. A
clear reading of the record and transcripts on file in this case
indicate that none of the foregoing was presented by either party
in the trial below.

Clearly the foregoing deprives the parties

from having a fair trial on the issues in the case.

If indeed

some additional information was found in the historical office of
the L.D.S. Church, the case should be remanded to the trial court
for further consideration.
The reasoning of the Appellate Court is clearly
erroneous and prejudicial to conclude that a clear definite main
channel of the Weber River existed in any of the years 1850,
1855/ 1866, or 1886. The boundary between the two counties was
the main channel Weber River, but where was the main channel
located.

It is impossible from the record for either the

Appellate Court or the Trial Court to come up with a metes and
bounds legal description of where the main channel of Weber River
was in the location of the subject property in the years referred
to above.
The survey notes shown in petitioners Exhibits 14, 15
and 16 were only surveyed along the section lines. There is
absolutely no legal metes and bounds description of the main
channel of the Weber River and this is especially true in the

This Utah Court of Appeals, though it was not present
to hear the evidence and see the demeanor of the witnesses,
concluded the trial court was wrong when it ruled that a
controversy did not exist at all times prior to 1893 as to the
location of the main channel of the Weber River so as to allow
Davis and Weber Counties to invoke the provisions of the 1888
compiled Laws of Utah S 86 which reads as follows:
Whenever any dispute or uncertainty shall
arise as to any county boundary, the same may
be determined by the county surveyors of the
counties interested, and in case they fail to
agree, or otherwise fail to establish the
boundary, the county courts of either or both
counties interested, may engage the service
of the aforesaid Territorial Commissioner,
who, with the said county surveyors, or
either of them, if but one appear for the
purpose, shall proceed forthwith to
permanently determine such boundary line at
the expense of the counties interested by
making the necessary surveys and erecting
suitable monuments to designate said
boundaries, which shall be deemed permanent
until superseded by legislative enactment.
Nothing in this act shall be construed to
give the surveyors, mentioned herein, any
further authority than to erect suitable
monuments to designate said boundaries as
they are now established by law.
(Same as the current Section 17-1-33, Utah Code Ann. (1953).)
Clearly the record and transcripts in this case reveal
this case was to be decisive of the boundary between Davis and
Weber Counties.
Exhibits "C,M HH" and M E H attached to the petitioners'
original brief clearly show that a dispute existed between Davis
and Weber Counties as to the location of the main channel of the
Weber River in the years prior to 1893. Weber and Davis Counties
were not trying to establish a boundary other than the location

of the main channel of the Weber River, but where was the main
channel located.
CONCLUSION
The reversal by the Court of Appeals is totally
contrary to the evidence presented,

it can only be assumed that

something was presented to the Court of Appeals that created some
kind of bias or prejudice against the petitioners in this case.
The foregoing manifested itself in the result oriented decision
rendered in this case.

There is absolutely nothing in the record

in this case for the Court of Appeals to conclude that a metes
and bounds description existed of the location of the main
channel of the Weber River prior to 1894.

That a controversy

existed as to the location of the main channel of the Weber River
in 1893 so to cause the two petitioner counties to have concern
where the boundary between their two counties was located.
The foregoing further manifests itself in the refusal
of the Court of Appeals to allow the petitioner Utah Department
of Transportation to litigate the issue of whether the tax sale
was conducted properly by Davis County.
It is abundantly clear the Court of Appeals exceeded
its discretion and went outside the issues raised on appeal and
the arguments and evidence presented in order to arrive at its
decision of reversal and refusal to allow the petitioner Utah
Department of Transportation to try the issues raised in its
answer.
The Court of Appeals was very shortsighted because by
this ruling it does total violence to the location of the current

boundary between Weber and Davis Counties.

Instead of helping to

permanently locate the boundary between Weber and Davis Counties,
this decision will create utter chaos.
The decision of the Appellate Court to reverse the
decision of the Trial Court will not put this case to rest, but
only serve to increase future litigation and appeals and create
confusion as to where the boundary is between Davis and Weber
Counties.
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Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
Ronald L. Baxter and Shirley Diane Baxter (the Baxters)
appeal from a judgment quieting title to six acres of land in the
Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). We reverse.

This dispute arises out of the territorial General
Assembly's use of the center of the channel of the Weber River as
part of the southern border of Weber County and the northern
border of Davis County, in combination with two facts. First,
until at least 1886, the river moved through more than one
channel in the vicinity of the property now claimed, by the
parties. Second, the channel of the Weber River now lies to the
south of the disputed property, but did not follow its present
course in years prior to 1894.
At the outset, we note that this is not an action between
counties seeking a judicial declaration of where their common
boundary lies on the ground at all points. Hor is this a lawsuit
between riparian owners on either side of a boundary river in
which each claims title to formerly- submerged land that has
surfaced because of a shift in the course of the river. This is
a quiet title action to six acres of land in which defendant
attacked plaintiffs' record title by challenging the title of
plaintiffs' tax deed grantor, Davis County, based on an
allegation that the property lies in Weber County. The issues
presented on appeal are: (1) when and where was the boundary
between Davis and Weber Counties fixed and established; (2) were
the subject six acres north (i.e., in Weber County) or south
(i.e., in Davis County) of that fixed boundary at that time; and,
if south, (3) was the location of the boundary thereafter moved
to the actual location of the Weber River in 1894 (i.e., to the
south of the subject six acres, thereby placing the six acres in
Weber County) either (a) by subsequent legislative enactment, (b)
by county action authorized by the legislature, or (c) by the
river's gradual and imperceptible movement there.
We begin our analysis of these issues with a full
presentation of the history of this litigation and of the
parties' competing claims to ownership. In March 1946, title to
an 18-acre tract near the border separating Davis and Weber
Counties was quieted in Tasma Dansie in a decree that contained a
legal description of the tract and characterized it as lying in
Davis County. The tract was conveyed by Tasma Dansie in March
1961 to Robert and Marie Dansie by way of a warranty deed
containing the following property description: "S 1/2 of N 1/2
of SW 1/4 of Sec. 25, 5 N., 1 W. SLM, Cont. 18.00 Acres in Davis
County." Tax sale proceedings were eventually initiated by Davis

County because of unpaid 1964 propertv tan»« 1 » A n . i * » . *.
and two others acquired the 18-ac?e t L c t 11 t e n ? S £ ? » ? J S ! !
under a tax deed from Davis County tha? wal e^IS?^"iS"S^7, D 2S6
1969. The following year, the t e L S t " i n " o m m S r e v t n ! v
* '
p a r t i t i o n e d the tract by reciprocal qui t e l a imdeedl and th*
^stent^tr^.aC9Uired ^

S U

*™

that^r^'sSje^of

In the meantime, however, the Dansies had conveyed the
on Ma y .?4 » E . The l f - , c « K K * &
i s s u e in t h i s case came) was described
heading -IN WEBER COUNTY - The S ^ p
» D A v y 8 ^ " 1 * 7 * " * WaS d e s c r i b e *

5
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.
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Weber County, Davis County had no authority tl Jax S l ' p l o p e r t y
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to acquire title when taxes were unpaid, or to convey title
through a tax deed.2 UDOT also pleaded collateral estoppel
based on a 1978 judgment dismissing a damage action by Ronald
Baxter's former cotenant, Toone, against the contractor UDOT
permitted to remove gravel from the property adjoining the
Baxters'.
In February 1983, the trial court granted UDOT summary
judgment on the collateral estoppel defense. Because Toone was
determined not to be the owner of the adjacent property in the
1978 judgment—based on a jury's determination that it lies

2. As an alternative defense, UDOT also pleaded that the 1969
tax deed from Davis County was invalid because statutory tax sale
procedures were not followed. In its brief, UDOT
mentioned—without citing us to the record—that trial of its two
defenses was "bifurcated" by the trial court, with the separate
trial on the alleged tax sjLlft invalidity to be heard only if UDOT
failed to establish the taxfleeflinvalidity at the first trial by
proving its allegation that the six acres lie within the
boundaries of Weber County. Our independent scrutiny of the
record before us in this ten-year-old action has unearthed no
oral or written motion for such a bifurcation, see Utah R. Civ.
P. 7(b)(1), a request presumably governed by Utah R. Civ. P.
42(b), and no order of the court granting such a request. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2). The issue of the validity of the tax
sale proceedings that led to the 1969 tax deed was not raised by
anyone at the pretrial hearing or explicitly preserved in a
pretrial order in this case for later resolution. Indeed, there
is no mention of this defense in the record before this court
other than in UDOT's pleading, in light of these circumstances,
UDOT must be deemed to have abandoned this alternative defense,
and it is not entitled to another trial on this alternate theory
if the judgment appealed from here, which is based on the
purported location of the subject six acres within Weber County,
cannot withstand appellate review.

within the boundaries of Weber County3~the trial court
concluded that Baxter could not relitigate that i.sue. On
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that application of t*L
collateral estoppel doctrine to the B a x t e r ^ J u U t ?i?leAction
was erroneous. Summary judgment in UDOT's favor was reversed
and the case was remanded, fiaxterv^otah
Den"t «J %£.I!I 4 A *
Yl m
P.2d 1167 (Utah 1985).
™ ™P f ftf TrWBP,, 705
At the bench trial in August 1986, the Baxter* rnnfon<t^
that the location of the boundary l i n e ' b e t w e e n t £ % o S f w a s
set by the actual location of the Weber River's main channel "
the time of the legislature's initial description of the
boundary, which they believed was on January 10. 1866 At th.t
time, they asserted, the Weber River was noTth of the 'subject tix
acres, putting them in Davis County. They cUimed that til
boundary's location has remained fixed in that spot since there
is no subsequent indication of legislative intenfto m £ e it Horn
there. Furthermore, they argued, the counties themselves had no
authority to move their common boundary from the legislltively
fixed location by thereafter agreeing to accept the surveyed
location of the main channel of the river in 1894, to the south
of the subject six acres, as their boundary.
UDOT, on the other hand, contended that there was
-uncertainty" about where the Weber/Davis County boundary line
was prior to 1894 because the river moved around before then and
because the excerpted survey notes in evidence did^St contain a
metes and bounds description of the Weber River's location on the
ground through Section 25 before 1894. This uncertainty was
resolved, UDOT claimed, when the Weber and D a v ^ G o u ^ y surveyors
surveyed a line down the middle of the channel of the W e S r liver
in 1894, when the river was concededly running to the south of the
3 . I t was not until after this 1978 judgment, in ToonTv
LeCrande Johnson Constr, Co,, Civ. N O . 20915 (Second District
Court, Davis County), that Davis County stopped assessing the six
acres claimed by the Baxters and tendered them a rebate of some
property taxes previously paid to it. At the loans trial, the
parties were apparently unaware of the 1866 statute setting firth
the description of the county lines, discussed in section I of
this opinion, infxj They stipulated that the location of the
Weber River upon statehood on January 4, 1896, marked the
boundary between Davis and Weber Counties. The jurors were,
therefore, asked to decide whether Toone's six acres were l4r»t^
County reference to the
0 t

tLfd1te

*

«i~V2t5iTcS5oJ S; S

property now claimed by the Baxters. Furthermore, because the
counties adopted the 1894 surveyed location of the river as
their common boundary line, that was the county boundary
thereafter adopted by the state constitution. This action by
the counties was authorized, UDOT argued, by the following
territorial act, adopted February 20, 1878:
Whenever any dispute or uncertainty
shall arise as to any county boundary, the
sane may be determined by the county
surveyors of the counties interested, and
in case they fail to agree, or otherwise
fail to establish the boundary, the county
courts of either or both counties
interested, may engage the service of the
aforesaid Territorial Commissioner, who,
with the said county surveyors, or either
of them, if but one appear for that
purpose, shall proceed forthwith to
permanently determine such boundary line
at the expense of the counties interested
by making the necessary surveys and
erecting suitable monuments to designate
said boundaries, which shall be deemed
permanent until superseded by legislative
enactment. Nothing in this act-shall be
construed to give the surveyors, mentioned
herein, any further authority than to
erect suitable monuments to designate said
^boundaries as they are now established by
law.
1888 Compiled Laws of Utah § 86 (now see Utah Code Ann.
§ 17-1-33 (1987)).
At the conclusion of trial, the court found that "the exact
location of the Weber River in 1866 cannot be determined,"
apparently because the evidence contained no description of its
course through Section 25 at that time along a surveyed line.
Although the trial court agreed with the Baxters that the
boundary had been legislatively established by the description
given in the 1866 enactment, it otherwise embraced UDOT's legal
analysis. The court concluded that the counties had, in 1894,
properly exercised the authority given them in section 86 of
the 1888 Compiled Laws to resolve the boundary uncertainty and
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We address first the question of the legislature's
establishment of the boundary between Davit £*»»!*• . 5 « 1^
County. The fixing of a c c ^ t T S S t a J i ! S T S S i . S t i S * '
prerogative, San J»»n r^tv v" nrfl°S ffnntT i a n J i F J J V . ,
371 P.2d 8 5 5 , ^ ( 1 9 6 2 ) , IT is the prescription Sf J 2 J 2 '
for resolving any uncertainty about the actual l f i r , f ? ^ 5 Jv .
boundary on the ground. Barton v SanLJf S i « l o c a * i o n o f that
162 P. 611, 612 (1916).
" • • P»nPfttft County, 49 Utah 188,

belieTtKs^
were first established 1» t l i ' t S S t S r t ^ f S S r W S i
Our research has revealed that Weber County? one of ?he fill
I'
six counties of what i s now Utah was rr..*li f l
J. f i r s tf a
January 15, 1850, act of ?he
toiSruFSJSrSl
ESS?* °
Laws and Ordinance . f t h f sttt¥ek If^*;**™*** 0 £? S e m " y : n a,
on file> at ChurchHiitorlan'i offiL ^ S e h n i ; ! ! <°"9i ls
Latter-Day Saints, Salt Lake City, uiah) (?ex? e fn?S ? r i S t 0 f
originals and printed in 8 OtthTu.Srtal ^ l W M l M o f T
Davis county was not created until an act of October 5 la so
Id. (text copied from originals and printed in 8 mlh
Historical Q. 190). We need not set forth r£2< I ¥ 1 \ * 6 8 8
originally described in these ^ L S L S T L S E j ^ n * 8?5^
^
5 t h e
segment of their common boundary at issue iS this i ? . i
'
moved by the territorial l e g i s l a t e
it
H ^ J 5S ^ K
expression of legislative intent, a January lT^S?* !^----?
.
took -all that portion of Weber county SSuTh of I ??' e n a c t m e n9t
down the centre of the main channel of til Sebtr r i ~r r 't™™
point due north of the north-west corLr «f 5KLJ ? ' - t o a
thence due west to the Grea? S i t till' and 5 K £ S V ? " '
Davis County £ h a1855
Territorial LawTof UUh? c^ L I U S SI22
n d w r i t t e n ori
LTcllltl]" °
9inal on file at S a h ^ e
Archives)
boun£ry%f^be^
property at issue in this case, by describing iI »« » ?• *
d0Wn
the center of the main channel of t £ S b S River
Itl™
esta lis
i C i E ^ / I S ^ *!«
J »ing ^counties- glogrJpMcal
limits was not contingent on any survey of the S i i S M S I - ,

location on the ground at that time, it is sufficient that the
county boundary was described in 1855 with enough certainty
that itth could have been definitely located on the ground at the
ena
^ ? 6 °L l
? 2 5 n J : *** Ba^Qn v. Banned Cn„n?T. U 2 p. a J
613. The described line is one down the center of the
nonnavigable river's -main channel," which is the bed of the
river over which the principal volume of water flowed. Black's
Law Dictionary 210 (5th ed. 1979). m the context of c o u n t y ^
boundary definition, where permanence is desirable, the "centre
of the main channel" provides a definitely locatable boundary
since the riverbed itself has permanent features that are
observable even if water does not flow in it year-round and
even if the river subsequently changes course and follows a
different channel.
We therefore conclude as a matter of law that the common
boundary between Davis and Weber Counties was established by
the territorial legislature in January 1855 as the location of
the center of the main channel of the Weber River at that
time. The trial court erred insofar as it used the 1866
enactment and the 1866 location of the river's main channel as
the relevant temporal and topographical reference points.
II.
We move next *o the question of the location of the six
acres claimed by the Baxters in relation to the main channel of
the Weber River in 1855. It is clear from the evidence
presented at trial, including the expert testimony introduced
by UDOT, that the river moved and took different paths through
the southwest quarter of Section 25 before 1894. A United
States Government Land Office survey of that area was conducted
in October 1855, and a map (Exhibit D-14) was drawn based on
the field notes. The following notation appears on the face of
the map:
This map of Township Ho. 5 north of
Range No. 1 West of Salt Lake Meridian is
strictly conformable to the field notes of
the survey thereof on file in this office
which have been examined and approved.
/s/ David H. Burr
Surveyor General of Utah

The total number of acres surveved « w ™ ^« *
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channel) was indisputably runnin9 east-west to tha «m,fh „* ..K.
subject six acres. nonetheless" the c?ear weijnt " t n e
'
S i S - 5 ^ h nn 1 ^ f ' n e ' w e S r ^ e f in^lsS? . £ ? ' "It
until at least 1886;* thus. t n ^ e ' w i t n j n " ^
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III.
We next consider whether the physical location of the
relevant county boundary was moved after 1855. Once the
legislature established the geographical limits of Davis and
Weber Counties in January of that year, their common boundary
remained in the actual location of the center of the main
channel of the Weber River at that time unless and until
changed to a different location on the ground in accordance
S ? S % 2 2d a f ? f i l * ? ^ V
S^HLlllUhfr-ro , 258 M a .
Henderson, 64 Ohio 83, H O N.E.2d 817, 820 (1952); SS& AifiO.

Barton v. Sanpete County, 162 p. at 612. Between left and
statehood, the territorial legislature frequently reshaped and
redefined the boundaries of counties in the northern third of
what is now Utah. £ss generally Allen, The gvr>inMnn off m , , ^
Boundaries in Utah, 23 Utah Historical Q. 261, 266-77 (19551
However, there is noinjUee^oTTthat it intended to change the
geographical limi|r-bTDavis and Weber Counties that it had
established in 1855.
The legislative description of the line separating Davis
»?^r e $ts«; C0U ?^!n Ji? »ot substantively change in enactments
after 1855. In an act of January 17, 1862, the same basic
description of Davis County's northern boundary line, but from
the opposite direction from that used in 1855, was set out:
All that portion of territory bounded
south by Great Salt Lake County, west by
the Eastern shore of Great Salt Lake,
5. Although the various experts disagreed over whether it was
possible to determine from the excerpts of survey field notes
which of the channels was the main channel in 1866, there was
agreement that the maps and field notes did not show any river
water flowing to the south of the subject six acres.

north by a line running due East from a
point in said shore to a point in the

center of the channel of Weber River north
from the northwest corner of Kingston's
Fort, thence U P the center of said
channelloJ to the center of the lower
canyon of said river, and East by the
summit of the Nasatch mountains, is hereby
made and named Davis County.
Acts. Resolutions and Memorials of the Territory of Utah
1851-70 40 (emphasis added) (on file at Utah State Archives).
Four years later, the relevant northern boundary line of Davis
County was again described as
a line running due east from a point on
[the eastern shore of the Great Salt Lake]
to a point in the centre of the channel of
[the] Weber river due north from the
northwest corner of Kingston's Fort,
thence up the centre of said channel to a
point opposite the summit of the Wasatch
mountains. . . .
1866 Territorial Laws of Utah, ch. CXLVI, S 14; 1876 Compiled
Laws of Utah § 156. Weber County was simply described as being
bordered on the south by Davis County. Id., S 15; 1876
Compiled Laws of Utah § 157.
In a February 1880 territorial enactment, apparently the
last legislation on the subject prior to statehood, the
6. In the absence of any legislative intent indicating
otherwise, we construe the legislature's use of "the center of
the channel" and "the center of said channel" in this and all
subsequent enactments describing the relevant county boundary
as meaning the center of the "main channel" of the river,, the
phrase used in the 1855 enactment in apparent recognition of
the fact that there was more than one river channel at some
points. As the Weber County surveyor testified in this case,
if a boundary line between counties is described as the center
of the channel of a river, that means the center of the main
channel of the river. Furthermore, it is standard practice
within his profession for a person charged with the job of
surveying the channel of a river to determine and follow the
main channel if there is more than one.

relevant northern boundary of Davis County was again described
as a line due east from a described point on the east shore of
Great Salt Lake to a point in the center of the channel of the
Weber River due north from the northwest corner of Kingston's
Fort, "thence up the center of said channel to a point opposite
the summit of the Wasatch mountains. . . . " 1888 Compiled Laws
of Utah § 65. The southern boundary of Weber County was again
described as being Davis County. Id., § 66. 7
Utah's state constitution, adopted by the people in
November 1895, went into effect on January 4, 1896, the day it
was admitted into the Union. Article XI, § l provided:
The several counties of the Territory
of Utah, existing at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution, are hereby
recognized as legal subdivisions of this
State, and the precincts and school
districts now existing in said counties,
as legal subdivisions thereof, and they
shall so continue until changed by law in
pursuance of this article.
7. By describing the northern Davis County perimeter from the
opposite direction, the wording but not the content of the
first post-statehood act defining county boundaries varied from
that found in some of the earlier enactments. The relevant
northern Davis County boundary was still described as a line
from a point where the Wasatch range summit line crossed the
middle of the channel of the Weber River, "thence westerly down
the middle of said channel to a point north of the northwest
corner of Kingston's Fort. . . . " 1898 Rev. Stat, of Utah,
title 12, ch. 1, S 464. The same description of the northern
Davis County boundary appears in the current statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 17-1-9 (1987), and its predecessors since 1898.
In the 1898 statutes, however, the legislature no longer
described the relevant southern boundary of Weber County simply
as Davis County; instead, it was specifically described as a
line from a designated point on the east shore of Great Salt
Lake, "thence east to the middle of the channel of Weber river;
thence up the middle of said channel to a point where crossed
by the summit line of the Wasatch range. . . . " 1898 Rev.
Stat, of Utah, title 12, ch. 1, § 486. The same description
appears in the current statute, Utah Code Ann. § 17-1-32
(1987), and its predecessors since 1898. It is apparent: that
the 1898 statute did not alter the southern Weber County
boundary, but merely described it from the direction opposite
that used in 1898 to describe the northern Davis County
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Government lot lines, and all Topographical data as shown by
the records of the Surveyor General's Office. . . . " They
approved a contract with draftsman E. A. Vail for this work on
October 2, 1893. At the same meeting, the clerk was instructed
to write to the Weber County Surveyor for "notes of the survey
of the Weber River between Weber and Davis Counties." The
minutes of a December 26, 1893, Board session documented a
complaint by one Timothy Kendall that he had been assessed, and
had paid, taxes on one piece of land by both Weber and Davis
Counties. On January 15, 1894, the clerk reported to the Board
that the Weber County surveyor had informed him he had no notes
of a survey of the line between Davis and Weber Counties. He
also verified that Timothy Kendall had been double taxed in
some undetermined amount "on account of the County line not
being properly located . . . ." According to a committee
report, completion of Mr. Vail's map was awaiting notes of the
Davis/Weber County line and surveys of two other segments of
the Davis County perimeter, which the committee considered "a
necessary adjunct to the map." The committee's recommmendation
that surveys of these three lines be conducted so they could be
properly located on Mr. Vail's map was approved on January 15,
1894.
There is no further mention of the county boundary until
the minutes of the March 19, 1894, board meeting:
The matter of permanently locating
the County line between Davis and Weber
Counties was referred to the Surveyor to
confer with the authorities of Weber
County with a view to permanently locating
said line with power to call for such
assistance as he may need in the matter.
The board approved a $106 claim by the surveyor of the county
line, T. H. Phillips (who was also the Davis County Clerk), on
May 7, 1894, and ordered the survey notes recorded. There is
no indication in these notes that the surveyors ever consulted
the 1855, 1871, and 1886 field notes and maps from the
Government Land Office and the Surveyor General or went out
onto the land to determine the actual location of the river's
main channel when the boundary was established by the
legislature. The 1894 survey notes clearly show that Phillips
and the Weber County Surveyor simply took the language of the
legislature's description of the Davis and Weber County
boundary in section 65 of the 1888 Compiled Laws of Utah and
proceeded to survey a line from "a point in the center of the

channel of the Weber river due north of the northwest corner «*
Fort Kingston, thence east to the above naSeS p o i E in ? £
°f
center of the channel of the Weber River . . . thence « D
L
center of the channel of the Weber River to a Mint A».>*.4?Z
the summit of the Wasatch mountains,- tie lattl? w i n H e l ™
80' north of the center of the river opposiJi tne'suSmi?? 9
As we held in the earlier sections of this opinion the
relevant boundary between Davis and Weber Sunties was'
legislatively established by the January 10, 1855, enactment as
the actual location of the center of thl main channel Sf^Se
Weber River at that time, and that boundary was not
subsequently moved by legislative enactment. The trial court
apparently concluded that, in section 86 of the 1888 Comoiled
Laws of Utah, the territorial legislature deletaJS .utSSrlS
to Dayis and Weber Counties to disregard that unequivocal and
certain 1855 expression of legislative intent and to, in
effect, move their common boundary to a new location i *
t-*
the physical location of the rivel in 1894? This cSncluSion If
law underlies the trial court's pivotal factual finding JhJt
the 1894 survey -set the river definitely- and thatthl
disputed six acres -is and has always been in Weber county.On appeal, this court may set aside findings of fact, in
actions at equity or in law, only if they are clearlv
?f,f0!!e?Sf;x R ! l d „ v - Mu1 ~" al o f ftma>,<> Tnfi. fn,, 776 P.id 896
(Utah 1989); Barter y, rrnnrif?, 741 p.2d 548 (Utah ct A D D
1987);fififiUtah R. Civ P. 52(a). A finding is cJeiriy P P *
erroneous if it is without adequate evidentiary support or if
it was induced by an erroneous view of the law! state v
Halfcei, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). m detenilninf^hether
a trial court's finding was thus induced, we g i v T ™ defe^Scf
to the trial court's view on issues of law. Xnslead, we review
the trial court's legal conclusions, including its conslrucIiSn
of a statute, under a correction-of-error standard
iSr,,*! •
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We disagree with the trial court's interpretation of the
authority given to the counties by section 86. There is
evidence of uncertainty in 1894 about where the boundary
between Davis and Weber County was actually located on the
2 J 2 5 . ? S J ° E « r f t ? a l ° n S t h ?i ^ ^ ^ that canno? be
ascertained from the record evidence. However, although
section 86 authorised the county surveyors to locate and mark
county boundaries upon the ground in the event of uncertaintv
or dispute, their statutory authority was express 1J lSited to
the erection of suitable monuments -to designate said

boundaries as they are now «««^hilgh«m t^ l i W . 18ftft O M m 4 i i *
Laws of Utah $ 8 6 (emphasis added]> 7 We interpret"f® 0 w n p l l e d
limitation as a requirement that the surveyors look not 4.,.<- «-„
the legislature's words describing a countyline bu? h J K £
legislature's intent regarding tte .ctuaTlocatJon £ t e
boundary as -established by law" in 1855. Because the
surveyors in 1894 disregarded the actual location of the middle
of the abandoned channel followed by the Weber Rivel wh®n £he
counties' boundary was legislatively established IS 1855? thlir
action was invalid as not in compliance with the strictures of
section 86. Therefore, the Davis County CommiMiSnlrS'
adoption of the surveyed location of the river in 1894 as the
-permanent- boundary" (until superceded by legislative
enactment) was of no force or effect in moving the northern
^^17
^ r 1 ^ 0 0 ! 1 1 ^ * 0 t h e l o c a t i o n ©* the river channel
in 1894. Thus, the trial court's findings that the 1894 survev
: set the river definitely- and that the property a? iSsiie SeTJ
-is and has always been in Weber county,- inasmuch as they are
t
S err
U S int
£86,
• must
%£U£ be 2set
p t aside
^ £ U ^as
? n e 0erroneous.
erpretation of section
1 clearly
Finally, we consider whether the relevant intercountv
boundary moved from the 1855 Weber River location to the 1894
Weber River location by operation of the doctrine of
accretion. Accretion is the slow and imperceptible deposit of
alluvium or silt on one riverbank and erosion of the other
10. Although the Weber County Surveyor and the Davis County
Surveyor testified at trial that they regarded the 1894 survey
as definitively designating the boundary between Weber and
Davis County, that view was obviously not shared by Davis
County itself, which had assessed the disputed property as
being within its territorial limits from at least 1930
resulting in Davis County's tax deed to Tasma Dansie in June
1938. Furthermore, the Weber County Assessor was still
complaining to Weber County Commissioners at a January 4 1904
meeting about problems in making accurate assessments because '
the boundary line with Davis County was still unsettled. In a
response, one of the commissioners wisely opined that the
matter could only be resolved through remedial legislation, in
any event, the counties' acquiescence in the 1894 river
location as their boundary is immaterial in light of the
certain and locatable description employed by the 1855
legislature when it fixed %he boundary. See San Jimn
r,»i»«-~ Grand County. 371 P.2d at 857.
" ™ n smmTY Yl

bank that gradually changes the location of the river eh.««.i
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City of Lawrence Yl Mrfirftw#

211 Kan# 8 42,

Jos p Id Sfo J?? *

(1973). Simply put, the doctrine of accretion ntltll
i>*l
where a river forms a boundary between cSSntiSs J!S Sr«n!r^
owners, the movement of that boundary riv« ovlx U m S
thtllln
the erosion process works a change il the boundary ! S d 9
therefore, in the ownership of exposed land S E J ^ L S T L
the side of the riyer opposite t 5 ^ S ^ ^ \ f ~ 5 £ . ~
movement, See. Matthews Y . MCfiftf, 358 F.2d 516, 517 tilt e?r
1966) (applying Arkansas law); City nf Ttfl1Trftnrr 5 i*S«L «A.

)llJ*?k£s*

i p# 1 ? 7 5 ) ;

Tavis v

- H*Ta1nn. 157 H.w.2d 7ia 72«

(1918) (applying accretion doctrine M a matter of fedeJI!'ill
to interstate boundary formed by navigable r i m ? - Ifftl I

fiQlift, 71 Utah 91, 262 P. 987 (1927) ? i S « S JijSifr**
applicability not raised by State's complaint setting out
lakeshore landowner's claim of title to lake bottomiiLS L

Sf^f^^Sf^^ 8 1 1 ^

e ) ;

*»"***« Y, ftmn^n it 5?ah"ST37%

250 (1894) (applying accretion doctrine as a matter of fed*;.!
law to determine federal patent grantee's title tlnewlv
surfaced Utah Lake bottomland), in contrast, where 1 lnfl,rv
river suddenly abandons its channel and occupies a n e w ^ n e T
because of natural or manmade forces, the doctrine does no?
apply. Such a shift is said to be avulsive? and" U rtluTs
in
no movement of the county boundary or change in ownership I*
the land avulsively transferred flom one Side
ItTSTSSrto
the o^er. Thomson Y. ClnrKf? TnrIL, 162 Colo. 506, 427
P?2d
314, 317 (1967); City Of Lawronc* y. M ^ r n t 5 0 8 p # « 7 *•J°

Witter v. County offit,rhaxles., 528 s.wtfd at u i Mccafferiv
y^Jteuna, 144 Mont. 385, 397 P.2d 96, 99 (1964); 01 sen y
toL££,
412 P.2d
162,at
167173.
(Okla. 1966); Lfi I r i f l i s i r i ^
Tennessee,
248 u.s.

t

Y

Although we are aware of no Utah precedent applying the
accretion doctrine as a matter of state law to the movement of
intrastate county boundaries, the preliminary i s s u e ^ T u s
applicability was not contested, briefed, or ruled unon J« f h a
trial court. Nor has it been raised o T a p p L " ^he*?rU?
court simply found that the Weber River's movement to itS 1894
location was not avulsive.
««»««. to ics iuy4
Assuming, aj^uenflfi, that the doctrine of accretion is
applicable and relevant to a determination of which cSuntv the
subject six acres lie in, the trial court's findino ««?£?.
P
° ^ , O U ? \ J 1 8 0 ^ 8 e t a s i d e •• c l e " ^ erJoneSw?9 S e
llUr
weight of the evidence conclusively shows that~the WebSr
River's movement to its 1894 location was no? the reSuU of

accretion. The river was flowing east-west considerably to the
north of the subject six acres as late as October 1886. By the
time of the 1894 survey, fewer than eight years later, the
river had moved its course entirely to the south of the subject
property, which is itself over 400' wide measured from north to
south. In the spring of 1894, the river crossed the western
border of Section 25 at a point more than 1,500' south of where
it had crossed that section line in the earlier Government Land
Office surveys. We hold that this drastic shift in such a
short time, whereby the river completely changed its course to
a new channel due to natural or manmade conditions, constitutes
avulsion as a matter of law. figs McCaffarHr v . Young. 397 P.2d
at 100 (lateral migration of river's channel one-quarter mile
in fewer than 100 years, "perceptible over the period of just
one generation," would be avulsive even in the absence of clear
evidence of a sudden flood). Accordingly, the location of the
boundary between Davis and Weber Counties did not, by
application of the doctrine of accretion, move with the river
from the location of its old channel in 1855 to its location in
1894 south of the property claimed by the Baxters. The
disputed six acres is, therefore, within the fixed boundaries
of Davis County.
In light of UDOT's failure to establish that the disputed
six acres is located within the boundaries of Weber County,
which was the factual basis for its defense,11 the trial
court erroneusly concluded that the 1969 tax deed from Davis
County was invalid. We reverse the judgment below and remand

11.
Where a defendant in an action to quiet
title claims to be the owner of the
property and seeks to have title quieted
in him, he has the burden of proving the
allegations of his claim and, in effect,
becomes a party plaintiff.
Tflyjfi v. Hi gains. 157 R.W.2d at 724.fififiGatrell v. Salt Lake
County. 106 Utah 409, 149 P.2d 827 (1944) (once quiet title
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of ownership, defendant
has the burden of going forward with proof of his challenge to
plaintiff's title).

this case to the district court for entry of a judgment
quieting title to the property at issue in the Baxters?"

Norman H. Jacksjfti, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

12.

See note 2, supra.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF

A P P E M . S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ , ^ ^
^

ooOoo

Ronald L. Baxter and Shirley Diane
Baxter, husband and wife,

DEC 201989
A* «Rk of * • Cocrt
1
C#urt •< Appetts

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 890175-CA

v.
Utah Department of Transportation,
Defendant, Third Party
Plaintiff, and Respondent,

v.
Robert Rees Dansie; Marie Grow
Dansie; Davis County Assessor;
Davis County Commissioners; Davis
County Recorder; and Weber County,
Third-Party Defendants.

Appellant's petition for rehearing is hereby denied,
DATED this

FOR THE COURT

of December, 1989.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the *#
day of December, 1989, a
ue and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DENIAL OF PETITION
iR REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail.
Glen E. Fuller
Attorney for Appellant
245 N. Vine Street #608
Salt Lake City, Utah
84103
Stephen C. Ward
Assistant Attorney General
124 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
Gerald E. Hess
Assistant County Attorney
Davis County Courthouse
Farmington, Utah
84025
Brent E. Johns
Assistant Weber County Attorney
2411 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah
84401
DATED this*s2£_ day of December, 1989.

yz^Zf^dt

By
/

fP=r2s/

Deputy Clerk^/^

17-1-3

COUNTIES

17-1-3. Existing counties adopted.
The several counties as they are in this chapter named and described are
the counties of the state until otherwise changed by law.
History: ILS. 1888 ft CJL1907,1 458*,CX.
1917, I 1282; KB. 1833 ft C. 1943, 18-14.

Crowe Reference. — Existing counties Tecognized, Utah Const Art H, Sec 1.

17-1-4. Beaver county — Description.
Beaver county: Beginning at a point on the summit of the range separating
the Beaver and Pahvant valleysfromSevier valley east of a point two miles
south of the south side of Fort Wilden on Cove creek, thence west to the state
boundary; thence south to the line separating townships 30 and 31 south;
thence east to the summit of said range; thence northerly along said summit
to the point of beginning.
History: ILS. 1888 ft CJL 1807,1 460; CX.
1917, | 1283; ILS. 1933 4 C. 1843, 18-1-4.

17-1-5. Box Elder county — Description.
Box Elder county: Beginning at the intersection of the northern boundary of
the state and the summit of the range next east of Malad valley, thence west
to the northwest corner of the state; thence south to the forty-first parallel of
north latitude; thence east to the western shore of Great Salt Lake; thence
northeasterly along and to the middle point of, a straight line drawn between
said point on the lake and a point on the east shore thereof due west of the
middle of the channel of the Weber river at a point north of the northwest
corner of Kingston's fort; thence northeasterly along a straight line drawn
from said middle point of said line to a point on the west line of range 3 west,
due westfromthe Hot Springs situated at the point of the mountain north of
Ogden; thence east to said springs; then northeasterly along the summit of the
spur range terminating at said springs to, and thence along, the summit of the
Wasatch mountains, passing around the headwaters of Box Elder and Willow
creeks, and crossing the Bear river at the middle point of its lower canyon, to
and thence northerly along, the summit of the range of mountains next east of
Malad valley to the point of beginning.
History: ILS, 1888 ft CJL 1807, t 461; CX.
1817, I 1284; BS. 1833 4 C. 1843, 18-1-6.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Judicial notice of county's territorial ex- travel in said county, it would be impoeable to
tent
verify a complaint in many parts of the county
The Supreme Court will take judicial notice and file the same on the day it is verified.
of the territorial extent ofthis county, and that James •. Jensen, 50 Utah 485, 187 P. 827
by the usual means of transportation and (1817).
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east along the touth boundarv lin** rf'a^^^L"'™v *AW~ u~/*•*•'• "•«"**
.ix <26)£the n ^ w T c ^ ^ ^
(1) north of range twenty-four (24) east t h e ^ ^ f i ? i
^ town»hjP one
said section M t y « i (36), t o ^ ^ u ^ w e s t ^ J L ' f ? ^ L ? " V* "»• o f
to the northweaTcorner of t o w £ £ p o n T ^ i I f S L T S T
ftf2?
east; thence south along the westbou^rv i S ? ™ T t* 611 *- 6 ™ <25>
range twenty-five (25) W t o S e l ! S k S ^ ! ^ T ^ ^ ff « « * <*
east along the south boundary ^ ™ ^ n s ^ ^ ? , £ ^ * " " *
(32), township one (1) smrthif rangj ^ n v ^ T ^ 3 ^ ^
^ ^
corner of section four (4), tmStmm^A^JT^
V"^?*"9*
east; thence south along t h e ^ S u n d a r y f t J S S S 8 ! ? ? »
(9), to the west quarter corner of s e c t i ^ i ™ To w
?? four ( 4 ) ""* B1De
range t w e n t y - f i v e X e a T * e n ^
of
(9), ten (10), eleven (11), and twelve ( 1 2 ) t o w ^ S l ™ of sections nine
twenty-five (25) east to the Colorado^ s t a t e £ r S ? P
° i ? f U t h o f *—
rado ^ate line to the point o f ^ S
^
**
^
History: Governor's Proclamation, No•ember 16, 1917; OL. 1917, i 1397; RA
1833 ft C. 1943,19.14; L» 1943. eh. 18, | l.

17-1-9. Davis county — Description.
Davis county: Beginning at a point in the middle of the channel of th*
Weber river where crossed by the summit line of the WaJatehr^! • ?
westerly down the middle of said channel to a ooint n * t £ ^ £ ^ , J ? ~ M *
corner of Kingston's fort; thence west to the ea£ I r e ^ G r e ^ ^ T *
thence southwesterly along and to the middle D o m t r f T j £ X ? v
*
between said point on thelast shore
^ u S ^ ^ S X S S S f V
at latitude 41 degrees north; thence southeaster* S ^ a S S ? ? *
^
ning between Black Rock on the s o u t h e r n ^ S S d l a k e ^ L ^ S ? *
point of said line to the base line of the United StateT Ju™>f1
***!*
easterly and equidistant between A n t e l o w ^ d a ^ \ h T I ^ ^
f^l
lake to a point west of the mouth c t £ £ £ £ S t 3 ^
W ^ T *
1 west; thence east to the mouth of the Jordan S 3 vJ w e s t l ™ e o f range
the middle of the channel rf toe Jordan rive? £ ^ ™ •** f ™ ? " " * ^ «P
rods north of Hot Spring m i e t , r S p ^ oflalt L ^ l r t 1 * P ° f a t 1 3 6
toe ^mmit of toe g r a n g e t e S ^ t ^ H ^ , ^ S S
£ £
easterly along said last mentioned summittoits mtersectioTSth J S £
northerly along, the summit of toe Wasatch r a ^ l X ^ b C u n g *
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17-1-33

boundary line of the state of Utah; thence west along the Utah-Arizona
boundary line to the west boundary line of the state of Utah; thence north
along said w e s t boundary line to the point of beginning.
History: R.S. 1898 * C.L. 1907, § 484; L.
1917 ch.34,6 1; C X . 1917, § 1319; R.S. 1933
\ C. 1*43, 19-1-30.

17-1-31. Wayne county — Description.
Wayne county: Beginning at the middle of the channel of the Green river at
latitude 38 degrees and 30 minutes north, thence west to the line between
ranges 5 and 6 east; thence north to a point east of the point where the wagon
road crosses the summit between Marysvale and Monroe; thence west to the
summit of the range between the Rabbit and Grass valleys; thence southwesterly along said summit to the Salt Lake meridian; thence south to the line
between townships 30 and 31 south; thence east to the middle of the channel
of the Colorado river; thence northerly up the channels of the Colorado and
Green rivers to the point of beginning.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 485; CJL
1917, § 1320; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-1-31.

17-1-32. Weber county — Description.
Weber county: Beginning at the intersection of the summit of the Wasatch
range north and east of the Ogden valley and the summit of the range separating the Bear Lake valley from the Cache valley, thence westerly to the Hot
springs near the county road north of Ogden along the summits of the
Wasatch range and the spur range terminating at said Hot springs; thence
west to the line between ranges 3 and 4 west; thence southwesterly in a
straight line to the middle point of a line drawn from a point on the east shore
of Great Salt Lake west of the middle of the channel of the Weber river north
of the northwest corner of Kingston's fort to a point on the west shore of said
lake at latitude 41 degrees north; thence northeasterly along said last described line to the east shore of Great Salt Lake; thence east to the middle of
the channel of the Weber river; thence up the middle of said channel to a point
where crossed by the summit line of the Wasatch range; thence northeasterly
along the summit of said range around the headwaters of the Ogden river to
the point of beginning.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 486; C.L.
1917, § 1321; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-1-32.

17-1-33. Disputed boundaries — Determination.
Whenever any dispute or uncertainty shall arise as to any county boundary
the same may be determined by the county surveyors of the counties interested, and in case they fail to agree or otherwise fail to establish the boundary, the board of county commissioners of either or both counties interested
shall engage the services of the state engineer, who with the aforesaid county
241
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surveyors, or either of them, if but one appears for that purpose, all having
received due and proper notice, shall proceed forthwith to permanently determine such boundary line by making the necessary surveys and erecting suitable monuments to designate the boundaries, which shall be deemed permanent until superseded by legislative enactment. Nothing in this section shall
be construed to give the surveyors or state engineer any further authority
than to erect suitable monuments to designate boundaries as they are now
established by law
History: R.S. 1898, § 487; L. 1907, ch. 82,
§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 487; CX. 1917, 5 1322; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 19-1-33.

Croas-References. — County surveyor,
§ 17-23-1 et seq
State engineer, § 73-2-1 et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Authority of Legislature
Compliance with statute required
Duty of legislature
State engineer's authority
Authority of legislature.
The legislature has the sole power to define
and determine the boundary lines between
counties, and to provide the means or methods
by which such boundaries, when in dispute,
may be established and marked upon the
ground Barton v Sanpete County, 49 Utah
188, 162 P 611 (1916)
Legislature, by reason of Const Art XI, Sec
3, is without authority to establish or locate a
new or any boundary line between counties
where a boundary line exists, unless the description of the boundary line is so indefinite,
uncertain, or ambiguous that the line cannot
be definitely determined, or for any other reason the line cannot be located on the ground, in
attempting to establish the correct line, the
legislature must determine the line as it was
intended to be established prior to the enactment of the correcting legislative act, any act
of the legislature attempting to establish a new
OT different knfc without regard to the original
intention is unconstitutional Summit County
v Rich County, 63 Utah 194,224 P 653 (1924)
The determination of county boundary lines
rests with the legislature San Juan County v
Grand County, 13 Utah 2d 242, 371 P 2d 855
(1962)
Where the legislative acts defining the
boundary are clear and unambiguous, the state
supreme court will not search for a meaning
beyond the statutes themselves San Juan
County v Grand County, 13 Utah 2d 242, 371
P.2d 855 (1962)
Compliance with statute required.
Trial court was correct in dismissing com-

plaint of San Juan County, seeking to enjoin
Grand County from exercising jurisdiction over
a disputed area, and a counterclaim filed by
Grand County, asserting its rights to the disputed area, where there had been no substantial compliance with this section However, m
so doing, the court should have declared that
as a matter of law the common boundary of the
two counties is Parallel 38 degrees 30 minutes
north latitude San Juan County v Grand
County, 13 Utah 2d 242, 371 P 2d 855 (1962)
Duty of Legislature.
It was duty of Legislature in attempting to
establish a boundary lme to follow the original
statutory description as nearly as practicable,
and, if it found it impracticable to follow it at
some particular point, then to establish a new
hne In doing so, however, it was still its duty
to be guided by what it conceived to be the
intention of the legislature which attempted to
establish the original line Summit County v
Rich County, 57 Utah 553, 195 P 639 (1921)
State engineer's authority.
In adopting this section, the Legislature did
not confer power upon the state engineer to
unconditionally determine and establish the
disputed boundary hne between two counties
The boundary hne which the state engineer
was authorized to establish, m the language of
the act, "shall be deemed permanent until superseded by legislative enactment" Accordingly, he could only conditionally or provisionally locate or establish a disputed boundary
hue Barton v Sanpete County, 49 Utah 188,
162 P 611 (1916)
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IN THE DISTRICT COORT OP WEBER COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
RONALD L. BAXTER and
SHIRLEY DIANE BAXTER,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD.,
a Utah corporation.
Involuntary Plaintiff,
vs
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant and

Third-Party Plaintiff,

Case No.

74206

vs.
ROBERT REES DANSIE, MARIE GROW
DANSIE, DAVIS COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, DAVIS COUNTY
ASSESSOR, DAVIS COUNTY RECORDER,
and WEBER COUNTY, a Body Politic
of the State or Dtah,
Third-Party Defendants.

The question presented in this case is:
Weber River in 1866.

Where was the

The boundary between Weber and Davis County

was established by description in an act of the legislature of
Utah Territory in 1866.

The description used the Bain cnannel of
Ill-a

•ge 2
•moranduin Decision
ase No. 74206
he Weber River as the boundary in the area of
roperty.

the subject

It i s the contention of the plaintiff that in 1866 the

eber River was north of the subject property, and the property
as,

therefore,

located

in

Davis

County.

Plaintiff

further

ontends the river later altered i t s course by sudden avulsive
ction caused by either man-made or natural conditions, so that
he subject property lands on the north side of the Weber River.
Plaintiff r e l i e s primarily upon three surveys:
855; one in 1877; and a third in 1886.
e s t border of Section 25.
iver

These surveys are ot the

The notes of these surveys show the

crossing the west boundary of

ocations,

One in

the section at

different

but primarily north of the subject property.

The

•roblem with this i s that i t does not show where the river was,
ay, 50 feet east of the border.
ng,

for

ixhibit

example,

It becomes even further confus-

both Plaintiff's

Exhibit 7 and Derendant's

7 are plat maps and show the river

somewhat north.

iowever, when you take Defendant's Exhibit 8, which i s Section 26
•ordering 25, the locations of the river are far off,

and the

>lat map in 26 shows the river crossing the border far south ot
rhat
(hows.

the

plat map in
Admittedly,

Plaintiff's

these

and Defendant's

Exhibit 7

plat maps are just that,

and are

m da ted, but they do show the confusion in regard to the actual
location ot the Weber River.
Ill-b

Page 3
Memorandum Decision
Case Mo. 74206

tn. encin.ers called „ « t n e | | M
,u,.«o n !

-en y o „ tea us wh.re

the

„,ber

vMn
Riv<r

M k M

^ flireet

^

It appears that in about 1891 •.,.. .
1B94, the surveyor of Davis
County and a deputy surveyor in Web.r r«„-»
/»« in weber County surveyed the river
Their survey shows the river to be. far .11 < .. ^
oe for
'
« " intents and purposes,
where it is today. This survey was don, »„der a statute ttat
.tates whenever any dispute or aiiS£imm
. a m rl„ „ ^
county boundary, the « . M y * ^
^
^
^
surveyors or the counties interested. m i . appear, t e be mit
the 1894 survey between the two county surveyors was. M a i n t i f f
contends that surveyors can only erect »o„u„e„ts. and that thev
cannot desionat, or aSree upon the boundaries. „o evidence that
they did anythino other than survey in order to clarify the
uncertainty. A s £oc « , „ 0 „- e r e e t i o n e£ ^ ^
^ ^
^
evidence indicates »on»ents are not generally erected a l0 „ g a
river, because a river is generally a .onuaent.
I_hoid,th.t the P ^ ^ ^ ^ o x j h ^ ^ d e n c e ^ o w s that
- V3* l ^ t i o n . c f ^ e . r i v e r . j n , ^ c ^ ^ B , . „ J ~;
.ppe-r. that the river, m . tt. pto,.tbi.i bi, ,o t i l l .. v e n t
wherever it wanted to. The 1855. »7i mnA ,.*
*«:>:>, 71, and '86 surveys of the
~ t section line indict. priaarUy tt.t tt, „„„
^
of
- . subject to ch.no.. „,„. i s n e evid , ne? u ^
^
^
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river changed i t . course by . sudden,
l..v,

M M y t

^

^

property north of the river i„ D.vi. County.

^ ^
i

^

farther

hold t h . t there w.s d e f i n i t e l y ^ _uncett.inty as to the i e e a t i e n
of

the

river,

which caused an uncertainty as

t0

"^Tce^

boundary, and .pursuant, to this s t . * , t e , _ j * i s _ . ujKer Uinty

My

d.termined^y_county, purveyors « n d . _ t h » _ s ! ^ d o n e _ i L i e 9 4 ,

be

,nd

that that survey established the boundary between the counties
ttat

survey was just t h . t , a survey of the location of the river,

and there i s certainly no evioence to i „ a i C a t . th.t the aurveyors
made any changes in the river, or did anyth<n, other
•urvey the river bv »etes and bounds.
river
Itself,

definitely.

thrust

The 18)4 survey s e t ~ ^ e

There being no prior surveys of the r i . . .

to place the_river in a location other * „ . . >K. ,".1.

survey i s -lust specnlannr,
I , therefore, hold that the boundary between Davis and
Keber Counties being the nam channel of the Weber River i s as
the

1894 survey place

the river, which description

Usicwly

coincides with the present location of the Weber River.
The subject property i s and has been in Weber County.
The s a l . by Davis County was invalid .nd of no effect . h . t . o .v.r.

Plaintiff i s , therefore, not entitieo to have the t » t l . ot

the real property quieted as against defendants.
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Detendant to prepare findings, conclusions and judgment
in accordance herewith.
DATED this J^

day of September, 1986.

ONXLD 0. HYDE,
RON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
1986,

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

S
the

day of September,
foregoing

Decision was served upon the following:
Stephen C. Ward
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Dtah Department
of Transportation
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Dtah 84114
Glen E. Fuller
Attorney for Plaintiffs
245 North Vine Street #608
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Gerald E. Bess
Assistant Davis County Attorney
Attorney for Davis County
County Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Brent E. Johns
Assistant Weber County Attorney
Attorney for Weber County
7th floor, Municipal Building
Ogden, Dtah 84401
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